Self-confirming price-prediction strategies for simultaneous one-shot auctions.

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Self-Con?rming Price Prediction Strategies for Simultaneous One-Shot Auctions Michael P. Wellman Computer Science & Engineering University of MichiganEric Sodomka Computer Science Brown UniversityAmy Greenwald Computer Science Brown University Abstract Bidding in simultaneous auctions is challeng- ing because an agent?s value for a good in one auction may depend on the uncertain outcome of other auctions: the so-called exposure prob- lem. Given the gap in understanding of gen- eral simultaneous auction games, previous works have tackled this problem with heuristic strate- gies that employ probabilistic price predictions. We de?ne a concept of self-con?rming prices , and show that within an independent private value model, Bayes-Nash equilibrium can be fully characterized as a pro?le of optimal price- prediction strategies with self-con?rming predic- tions. We exhibit practical procedures to com- pute approximately optimal bids given a proba- bilistic price prediction, and near self-...

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• [1] https://arxiv.org/abs/1210.4915