Equilibrium and prior selection problems in multipolar deployment

📖 Description

To [avoid catastrophic conflict in multipolar AI scenarios](https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/DbuCdEbkh4wL5cjJ5/preface-to-eaf-s-research-agenda-on-cooperation-conflict-and), we would like to design AI systems such that AI-enabled actors will tend to cooperate. This post is about some problems facing this effort and some possible solutions. To explain these problems, I'll take the view that the agents deployed by AI developers (the ''principals'') in a multipolar scenario are *moves in a game*. The payoffs to a principal in this game depend on how the agents behave over time. We can talk about the equilibria of this game, and so on. Ideally, we would be able to make guarantees like this:

📊 Game Impacts

💭 Reactions

🔗 Sources

• [1] https://www.alignmentforum.org/posts/Tdu3tGT4i24qcLESh/equilibrium-and-prior-selection-problems-in-multipolar-1